I’m always amazed by the remarkable talents and extraordinary knowledge of SWLing Post readers. Dirk Rijmenants recently commented on one of our Cuban spy numbers station postings:
[T]hanks for your work on this fascinating blog.
I have additional information on how and who used these Cuban numbers stations. I composed a paper based on FBI and court documents. “Cuban Agent Communications” can by found in the Papers section of my website.
Here’s the direct link (pdf):
Have fun reading!
I’ve read Dirk’s paper, which does, indeed, shed light on the process of receiving and decoding numbers. Most of all, it exposes the vulnerability and fallacy of using anything other than one-time decryption keys and single-use pads. Why? Most of what the FBI has learned about Cuban numbers came from laptops that were used to help decrypt coded messages–an unnecessary procedure when numbers can simply be decoded on note pads that can then be burnt or destroyed.
But don’t take my word for it–download and read Dirk’s paper “Cuban Agent Communications” by clicking here. Also, be sure to check out Dirk’s blog and cryptology website; I’ve bookmarked both.
Thanks for sharing your findings, Dirk!
Thanks so much for this post and all your work on this blog. I’ve just begun listening to SW again and receive the Cuban station regularly. Very cool 🙂
It is also interesting to read the Russian techniques described in the criminal complaints of the 2010 Russian Spy case. The Russian spies used modified netbook computers, and encrypted adhoc wi-fi networks for meetups. The agents would not meet face-to-face, but were close enough for their netbooks to connect via wi-fi and exchange information. They used 27 character passwords to unlock Steganography software, but one spy had written the password down on paper and put it in plain sight. They also used Radiograms (coded bursts of data), and voice transmissions of number groups.